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RESTRICTED ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CANADIANS MISTREATED
ABROAD: ABDELRAZIK V CANADA (RE: INTERIM COSTS)
Sean Rehaag*
Abousfian Abdelrazik is a Canadiancitizen who, after having his
name added to various anti-terrorism lists, and after being
tortured by Sudanese officials, .found himself unable to return
home from Sudan largely because of Canadian government
actions.
Abdelrazik sought to challenge the constitutionality of these
restrictions on his ability to return to Canada.However, he had
no money and no means of support, as he was unable to leave
the Canadian embassy in Sudan where he had sought refuge to
avoidfurther torture by Sudanese officials. He therefore brought
a motion for interim costs in Canada's Federal Court. If
granted, this interim costs award would require the Canadian
government to pay his legal fees so that his constitutional
challenge couldproceed
In Abdelrazik v Canada, the Federal Court denied the
request for interim costs
a decision that has serious
implications not only for interim cost awardsjurisprudence,but
also for litigation involving citizens who allege that their rights
under section 6 of the Charter have been violated.
This comment critically analyzes the access to justice
implications of the Federal Court decision in light of both the
principle that courts may use costs awards to promote access to
justice, and the unique challenges faced by Canadians
mistreatedabroadby the Canadiangovernment.
Abousfian Abdelrazik est ce citoyen canadien dont le nom avait
jtj ajoutj c diverses listes de personnes soupconnies de
terrorisme, qui avait jtj torturipar les autoritissoudanaises et
qui a appris qu'il ne pouvait pas revenir au Canada
principalement en raison des mesures que le gouvernement du
Canada avaitprises.
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Gauthier, Karen Kunopaski, Anastasia Mandziuk and Noelle Dykman for their research
assistance. I would also like to thank Yavar Hameed, Amir Attaran, and Audrey Brousseau, pro
bono counsel to Abdelrazik, for insight into this case, as well as for providing copies of the court
documents in the Abdelrazik litigation. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the
Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security, which generously funded
the digitization and online publication of the court documents. The documents can be accessed
online: Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security
<http://nathanson.osgoode.yorku. ca/abdelrazik>.
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Abdelrazik souhaitait contester la constitutionnalit des
limites i sa capacit de rentrer au Canada. Toutefois, il n 'avait
pas d'argent ni aucun moyen de subsistancepuisqu'ilne pouvait
pas quitter l'ambassade du Canada au Soudan, oh il s'tait
rdfugi pour iviter d'tre tortur de nouveau par les autoritis
soudanaises. II a donc diposi une requte en vue d'obtenir une
provision pour les frais devant la Cour fidrale du Canada. Si
sa requhte avait t accueillie, le gouvernement du Canada
aurait&t tenu de payer ses honorairesd'avocats, et le tribunal
aurait entendu sa contestation de la constitutionnaliti des
mesures que le Canadaavaitprises.
Dans Abdelrazik v Canada, la Cour fidirale a rejeti la
requte. Cette dicision aura de graves ripercussions non
seulement sur la jurisprudence relative aux requtes en vue
d'obtenir une provision pour les frais, mais igalement sur les
instances mettant en cause des citoyens qui allguent qu'il y a
eu violation des droits qui leur sont garantispar l'article 6 de la
Charte.
Dans cet article, I'auteurproc~de c une analyse critique des
implications de la dicision de la Courfidrale sur /'accks a la
justice a la lumikre du principe voulant que les tribunaux
puissent accorder des dipens pour promouvoir l'accks a la
justice et des defis uniques que doivent relever les Canadiensqui
sont maltraitis . 1'V&ranger par le gouvernement canadien.
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing list of Canadian citizens have suffered egregious mistreatment abroad
as a result of actions taken by Canadian officials in the name of national security.'
Canadians mistreated abroad are especially vulnerable when it comes to access to
justice, understood narrowly in terms of access to courts. 2 Constitutional litigation
regarding mistreatment abroad raises some of the most serious human rights
violations imaginable, and yet those bringing forward such litigation face
enormous challenges. The individuals involved cannot do so in person, because
one of the forms of mistreatment they frequently face is being prevented from
returning to Canada. As a result, they must generally rely on counsel. However,
they may not be able to pay for counsel because they may be detained and
destitute, and they may have had their assets frozen on national security grounds.
Moreover, where they have been detained abroad for long periods they may not be
eligible for legal aid due to provincial residency requirements. It is hard to
1

Examples include: Maher Arar, Omar Kadhr, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El Maati, and Muayyed

2

Nureddin.
Of course, access to justice should be understood as more than merely access to courts. Access to
justice, understood broadly, raises not only issues of procedural and substantive rights, but also
the ability to participate meaningfully in forums where law is made, interpreted and applied. See
generally, Roderick A. Macdonald, "Access to Justice and Law Reform" (1990) 10 Windsor YB
Access Just 287. For an example of a broad approach to access to justice in the context of
Canadians mistreated abroad, see Jasminka Kalajdzic, "Access to Justice for the Wrongfully
Accused in National Security Investigations" (2008) 27 Windsor YB Access Just 171.
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imagine a more urgent scenario in which interim cost awards could facilitate
access to justice.
Yet, in Abdelrazik v Canada, the Federal Court denied interim costs to
Abousfian Abdeirazik, a Canadian who found himself unable to return home from
Sudan largely because government action thwarted his attempts at return. This
decision has implications not only for interim cost awards, but also for litigation
involving citizens who allege that their rights under section 6 of the Charter' have
been violated. This comment critically analyzes the access to justice implications
of the Federal Court decision in Abdelrazik in light of both the principle that courts
may use costs to promote access to justice, and the unique challenges faced by
Canadians mistreated abroad by the Canadian government.
II. ABDELRAZIK V CANADA
A. The Context
Abousfian Abdeirazik came to Canada from Sudan in 1990. In 1992, he was
accorded refugee protection and subsequently obtained Canadian citizenship.'
Although he has never been charged with a criminal offence,' he was suspected of
associating with individuals allegedly connected with terrorism. The nature of
these suspected associations is not entirely clear, though it should be noted that he
voluntarily testified against one of these individuals at a trial in the United States.'
What is clear is that security agencies in Canada and abroad acknowledge that they
have no evidence that Abdelrazik poses a security threat.! Similarly, no evidence
that he poses such a threat has ever been publically presented.!
In March 2003, Abdelrazik travelled from Canada to Sudan to visit his ailing
mother.1' During this visit he was detained and allegedly tortured by Sudanese
authorities for a period of 11 months." There is some evidence suggesting that his
detention came at the request of the Canadian government. Although the
government contests this evidence, a Canadian government memo obtained
through access to information procedures states: "Sudanese authorities readily
admit that they have no charges pending against him but are holding him at our
request."' 2 Moreover, the Canadian government concedes that during his detention

Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), 2008 FC 839, 73
Imm LR (3d) 139 [Abdelrazik (re: Interim Costs)], affd 2009 FCA 77, 79 Imm LR (3d) 1
4
5
6

[Abdelrazik (FCA re: Interim Costs)].
CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982 s 6 [Charter].
Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister of ForeignAffairs), 2009 FC 580, [2010] 1 FCR 267 at paras 9-10
[Abdelrazik (MainApplication)].
Ibid at para ll.

Ibid.
8

Ibid at paras 20 & 27-28.

9

Ibid at para I I
Ibid at para 12.

10

11
12

Ibid at paras 13 & 15-16.
Ibid at para 67.
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he was interrogated
by representatives of the Canadian Security Intelligence
3
[CSIS].1
Service
Sudanese authorities released Abdeirazik from detention in July 2004. Shortly
thereafter he sought to return to Canada. However, commercial airlines refused to
provide him with passage on the grounds that his name was included on a "no-fly
list".' 4 He also sought to return to Canada by alternative means, including on a jet
used by Canadian officials visiting Sudan, as well as on a jet offered by the
Sudanese government. Both possibilities failed to materialize, which Abdeirazik
with either plan.15
attributes to the Canadian government's refusal to assist
In October 2005, Abdelrazik was summoned to a meeting with Sudanese
authorities. On the advice of Canadian consular officials, he attended the meeting.
At the meeting he was re-arrested and detained for a further 9 months without
charge. He alleges that he was also tortured during this second period of detention.
Abdelrazik was once again released in July 2006."
Immediately following his release, Abdeirazik was added to the UN Security
Council Resolution 1267 list [Resolution 1267 list], maintained by the UN AlQaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee.17 His listing likely came at the request of
the United States, which, days before his listing, accused him of being "a person
posing a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism that threaten the security
of U.S. nationals and the national security."" By virtue of being placed on the
Resolution 1267 list, Abdeirazik's assets were frozen, and anyone who directly or
indirectly provided him funds became vulnerable to prosecution under Canadian
criminal law." Moreover, under international law, his listing subjected him to a
travel ban, which requires States to "[p]revent the entry into or transit through
,21
their territories of [listed] individuals."
In October 2007, Abdelrazik petitioned the Canadian government to intervene
on his behalf with the UN committee responsible for maintaining the Resolution
1267 list, requesting that he be delisted. While the government transmitted
Abdeirazik's request to the committee, that request was denied without reasons
being offered.2'
Notwithstanding Abdelrazik's inclusion on the Resolution 1267 list, he
continued to seek to return to Canada. Because his passport expired while he was
in detention, he required a new passport or emergency travel documents in order to
return to Canada. Canadian officials repeatedly assured him that, in the event he
secured passage to Canada, he would be provided the requisite documents.2

18

Jbid atpara 15.
Jbid atpara 18.
Jbid atpara 19.
Ibid atparas 20-22.
Jbid atpara 23.
Ibid atpara 22. See also ibid at para 24.

19

Ibid at paras 26 & 55-56. See also, Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on

13
14
15
16
17

the Suppression of Terrorism, SOR/2001-360, ss 3-4 [Anti-Terrorism Regulations].

20

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1822, S/RES/1822 (2008) s 1(b). See also,
Abdelrazik (MainApplication), supra note 5 at para 57.

21

Abdelrazik (MainApplication), ibid at paras 28-29 & 47-60.

22

Ibid atAnnex B.
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Internal government communications, however, indicate that Canadian authorities
intended to oppose his return to the country even if he secured a ticket.2
Abdeirazik remained stuck in Sudan. In April 2008, fearing that he would be
rearrested because his case had attracted media attention, Abdelrazik sought and
was granted temporary refuge in the Canadian embassy in Khartoum. Because he
was destitute, the Canadian government provided him with a loan of $100.00 per
month to cover his basic necessities while he remained in the embassy.2
In May 2008, having secured pro bono counsel in Canada, Abdelrazik sought a
Federal Court order requiring the government to repatriate him "by any safe means
at its disposal. 2 5The order was requested on the grounds that it was necessary to
remedy a breach of his right "to enter, remain in and leave Canada," as accorded to
Canadian citizens by section 6 of the Charter. It quickly became apparent that the
government intended to litigate the case. Abdelrazik's counsel sought an interim
costs award to ensure that the case could be litigated. 6 In July 2008, the Federal
Court denied the requested interim costs, a decision subsequently upheld by the
Federal Court of Appeal." The Federal Court decision is the subject of this
comment.
Faced with the Federal Court's denial of his motion for interim costs,
Abdelrazik's counsel continued to represent him pro bono on the main application
and ultimately succeeded on this application.
With regard to this main application, the government had offered highly
questionable arguments to justify their refusal to facilitate Abdelrazik's return to
Canada. Specifically, the government asserted that the Charterright of citizens to
enter and remain in Canada does not include a right of repatriation, because "the
right to enter Canada does not create a right to be returned to Canada".9
Alternatively, counsel for the government contended that even if there was a right
to be repatriated, that right was not engaged in this case" because Abdeirazik was
prevented from returning to Canada by his inclusion on the Resolution 1267 list
and the accompanying travel ban under international law, not by the Canadian
government." While government counsel conceded that the travel ban contains an
exemption for individuals returning to their country of nationalityj they argued
that this exception merely "relieves states of the obligation to turn their own
nationals away should they present themselves at the border." 3 The exception
would not, this reasoning runs, allow Canada to participate in Abdelrazik's transit
23

Ibid at paras 32, 102-108,153 & 156.

24
25

Ibid at para 30.
Ibid at para 6.

26

Abdelrazik (re: Interim Costs), supra note 3.

27

Ibid at para 3.

28

Abdeirazik (FCA re: Interim Costs), supra note 3.

29

Abdeirazik (MainApplication), supra note 5 (Respondent's Memorandum of Fact and Law) at

30
31
32

33

para 56.
Ibid at para 38.
Ibid at paras 39-45.
Ibid at paras 46-54.
Ibid at para 51.
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through other states, including by flying through the airspace of other states." As
counsel for the government put it, "[t]he applicant's return to Canada is impeded
because the necessary transit through the territories of other UN members is
prohibited by virtue of his listing on the Resolution 1267 list."" The government's
position was, thus, that to return to Canada, Abdelrazik first had to have his name
removed from the Resolution 1267 list.
The government's arguments contradicted prevailing practices in other states,
which frequently use the exemption to repatriate listed nationals notwithstanding
that they must pass through the airspace of other states." Similarly, a document
prepared on behalf of the UN committee responsible for the Resolution 1267 list
indicates that it is not even necessary for states to inform the committee when the
exemption is exercised to allow individuals to transit through other states in order
to return to their country of nationality. 7 Along similar lines, according to Richard
Barrett, a UN administrator who oversaw the Resolution 1267 list, "[t]he
overflight states don't come into it and they haven't ever come into it."" Although
the Canadian government's central argument was, therefore, not especially
compelling, government counsel nonetheless chose to continue litigating the main
application.
Other developments in that litigation are particularly noteworthy because they
suggest the extent to which Abdelrazik's return to Canada was frustrated by the
Canadian government. In August 2008, Abdelrazik secured a reservation on a
commercial airline to return to Canada. However, despite earlier assurances that he
would be supplied emergency travel documents if he obtained a flight to Canada,
the government declined to provide him with the necessary documents. Several
months later, the government indicated that they were prepared to provide him
with an emergency passport, but they imposed an additional requirement: not only
must he obtain a ticket, but the ticket also had to be fully paid. 3' This additional
requirement was followed by warnings that criminal charges under Canada's antiterrorist regulations could be laid against anyone who provided Abdelrazik funds
to purchase such a ticket."u Despite the threat of criminal prosecution, in March
2009 over 100 individuals publically contributed small donations towards the
purchase of a plane ticket for Abdeirazik to return to Canada.4' As a result, he
34

35

36

37

Ibid at para 43.
Ibid at para 41.

See e.g. Paul Koring, "Ottawa cites international obligations in denying citizen's return home",
The Globe and Mail (13 April 2009) A8 (citing the example of a listed Somali national who
transited through airspace and airports in the UK and Kenya using UK travel documents and an
exemption from the Resolution 1267 travel ban obtained by the UK in order to return to Somalia).
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning AI-Qaida
and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Travel Ban: Explanation of terms"
online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/EOTTravel

Ban 9 12 2008 ENGLISH.pdf>.

38

Paul Koring, "Ottawa's case for barring return of Canadian citizen doesn't wash, UN says", The

39

Globe & Mail (7 May 2009) Al.
Abdelrazik (Main Application), supranote 5 at paras 115-120.

40

Paul Koring, "Ottawa imposes another hurdle for Abdelrazik", The Globe & Mail (23 February
2009) Al.

41

Les Perreaux & Bill Curry, "Canadians defy law in bid to bring home one of their own", The
Globe & Mail (13 March 2009) Al. The full list of donors is online: Peoples Commission
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obtained a paid ticket to travel from Sudan to Canada. However, mere hours
before his scheduled flight, the Canadian government denied him emergency
travel documents on national security grounds. 2
Following a Federal Court hearing in May 2009, Justice Zinn ordered the
government to repatriate Abdelrazik. 3 Among the Court's more important findings
were: (1) CSIS was complicit in Abdelrazik's detention in Sudan;" (2) he was
tortured in detention; 5 (3) individuals included on the Resolution 1267 list are
entitled to transit through other states' territories in order to return to their country
of nationality; 6 (4) the only reason Abdelrazik was unable to return to Canada was
because of the actions of the Canadian government;" (5) these actions breached
Abdeirazik's constitutional right to enter and remain in Canada;" (6) the breach
could not be justified in a free and democratic society; 9 and (7) the government
acted in bad faith in breaching Abdelrazik's constitutional rights by repeatedly
assuring him that they would facilitate his return to Canada despite having no
intention of doing so. Shortly after issuing the decision on the main application,
Justice Zinn ordered the government
to pay costs on the main application to
5
Abdelrazik's pro bono counsel.

1

The government complied with the court order and Abdelrazik was repatriated
on 27 June 20092 He has since commenced civil proceedings ' seeking
of his rights.
compensation from the Canadian government for the breach
B. Abdelrazik v Canada (Re: Interim Costs)
When Abdelrazik's pro bono counsel brought the Federal Court application in
May 2008 seeking an order that the Canadian government repatriate him, 5 his
assets were frozen, he was unable to leave the Canadian embassy for fear of being
detained and tortured, he was subsisting on a $100.00 per month loan from the
Canadian government, and those who might otherwise assist him financially
appeared to be prohibited from doing so under Canada's anti-terrorism regulations.
To fund the litigation, efforts were made to secure legal aid on Abdeirazik's
behalf. However, having been detained in Sudan for several years, he was no
Network <http://www.peoplescommission.org/en/abdelrazik/supporters.php>. Disclosure: the
author is among the donors.

42

Abdelrazik (MainApplication), supranote 5 at para 130.

4,

Ibid at para 170.
bid at para 91.
Jbid at para 92.

44
45

46
47
48
49
50

Jbid at para 129.
Jbid at para 148.
Jbid at paral53.
Ibid at paras 154-155.
Jbid at para 153.

51 Abdelrazik v Canada (Ministerof ForeignAffairs), 2009 FC 816 [Abdelrazik (re: Ex Post Costs)].
52
Les Perreaux, "Mysterious people tailing Abdelrazik on his first days at home, lawyer says", The
Globe & Mail (29 July 2009) Al.
53 Abdelrazik v Canada,Ottawa, T-1580-09 (FCTD) (Statement of Claim of Abdelrazik, dated 21
September 2009) at paras 1-2 [Abdelrazik (re: Compensation)].
54
Abdelrazik (MainApplication), supra note 5 at para 6.
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longer considered a resident of a Canadian province, and therefore he was not
eligible for provincial legal aid funding. Not only was Abdeirazik destitute and
ineligible for legal aid, but his pro bono counsel was also unable to commit in
advance to assisting him for the duration of the litigation. Counsel swore an
affidavit contending that he could not maintain the expense of carrying the case
pro bono without personal hardship, concluding that the litigation would not be
asS.51
able to proceed on a pro bono
Justice Mactavish presided over Abdelrazik's motion for interim costs.
Applying British Columbia v Okanagan Indian Band' and Little Sisters Book &
Art Emporium v Canada, Mactavish J. held that Abdelrazik's circumstances did
not meet the conditions of the three-part test for granting interim costs, namely
that: (1) the party seeking interim costs cannot afford to finance the litigation and
that there is no other way for the litigation to proceed; (2) the claim is prima.facie
well founded; and (3) the claim raises issues of public importance. ' In particular,
Mactavish J held that Ablerazik failed to meet the first part of the test because,
while she accepted that Abdelrazik was impecunious, 60 she found that there were
two alternative means whereby the litigation could continue.'l
The first alternative identified was that counsel could continue to provide pro
bono services.62 Specifically, Mactavish J. found:
While Mr. Hameed does assert that the ongoing expense of
continuing to represent Mr. Abdelrazik will cause him personal
hardship, and that he does not believe that the litigation will be
able to proceed on the pro bono basis which has brought it to
this point, based upon the statements in his affidavit quoted
above, it is not at all clear from the record that either Mr.
Hameed or his associates will indeed be forced to withdraw from
the file if the motion is denied .
In other words, Mactavish J. required something more definitive than the belief
expressed by counsel that the file could not continue to proceed on a pro bono
basis. Absent "clear" evidence to this effect, Mactavish J. found that Abdelrazik
should attempt to continue pursuing the main application with pro bono
representation.

55

Abdelrazik (re: Interim Costs), supra note 3 at para 42.

56

Abdelrazik (re: Interim Costs), ibid, (Affidavit of Yavar Hameed) at paras 36-39 [emphasis

57

British Columbia (MinisterofForests) v OkanaganIndian Band, 2003 SCC 71, [2003] 3 SCR
371 [Okanagan].
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissionerof Customs and Revenue), 2007

added].

58

SCC 2, [2007] 1 SCR 38 [Little Sisters No. 2].
59

Abdelrazik (re: Interim Costs), supra note 3.

Ibid at para 36.
Ibid at paras 37-50.
62
Ibid at paras 37-39.
63 Ibid at para 39.
60

61
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The second alternative identified by Mactavish J. was for Abdelrazik to fund
the litigation privately, with the assistance of "family and friends in Canada"."4 She
noted that Canada's anti-terrorism regulations impose criminal penalties on those
who provide funds to individuals included on the Resolution 1267 list." However,
she also noted that according to government counsel it was, in principle, possible
to apply for an exemption from these criminal penalties where funds are provided
to cover the
66 basic expenses of a listed person, which might arguably include legal
expenses. In evaluating Abdelrazik's likelihood of successfully obtaining this
exemption, Mactavish J. acknowledged that the provisions setting out this
exemption are unclear, and that there was no case law offering guidance regarding
how to interpret them. She nonetheless found that Abdeirazik should attempt to
secure such an exemption prior to seeking interim costs, because there is "at least a
chance that [he] may be able to obtain an exemption... so as to allow his
supporters to assist him with his legal expenses."" Still, given the lack of clarity,
Mactavish J. declined "to offer an opinion at this point on the proper interpretation
of the Regulations.""
Based on her finding that there might be alternative means to fund the
litigation Mactavish J. held that Abdelrazik failed to meet the first part of the
Okanagan test. She therefore refused Abdelrazik's application for interim costs
without examining the remaining parts of the test." She did, however, go on to
note that if Abdelrazik's circumstances changed or if a request for an exemption
from Canada's anti-terrorist regulations was denied, he would be free to make a
71
new motion for interim costs.
Mactavish J.'s decision was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal without
comment.
1. Interim Costs in Individual Human Rights Litigation
The most straightforward implication of Abelrazik's experience lies in
Mactavish J.'s restrictive approach to interim costs. While it is now7
1
uncontroversial that costs awards can be used to enhance access to justice,
interim costs awards used to this end remain nonetheless highly exceptional,
largely because they require a party to fund an opponent's legal expenses while the
litigation is still ongoing. In other words, not only must the party fund both sides
of the litigation, but they must do so even though the merits of the case have yet to
64
65

66
67
68
69

70
71
72
73

Ibid atpara 43.
Ibid atparas 44-45. See also Anti-Terrorism Regulations; supra note 19, ss 3-4.
Abdelrazik (Re: Interim Costs), ibid at para 46. See also Anti-Terrorism Regulations, ibid s 5.7.
Abdelrazik (Re: Interim Costs), ibid at para 48.
Ibid atpara 49.
Ibid atpara 48.
Ibid at paras 51-52.
Ibid at para 52.
Abderazik (FCAre:Interim Costs), supra note 3 at para 1.
See generally Mark Orkin, The Law of Costs, 2 nd ed (Aurora: Canada Law Books, 2008) at
§219.5.2; Chris Tollefson, Darlene Gilliland & Jerry De Marco, "Towards a Costs Jurisprudence
in Public Interest Litigation" (2004) 83 Can Bar Rev 473 at491-493. See also, B(R) v Children's
Aid Society ofMetropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315; Okanagan, supra note 57 at para 26.

Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice

2011

be determined and thus the allegations and arguments that are relied upon to
justify the interim costs award have not yet been tested.
The common law test for when interim costs will be awarded reflects their
exceptional nature. The Supreme Court held in Okanagan that interim costs are
only appropriate where a primafacie meritorious claim which raises novel issues
of public importance would otherwise be unable to proceed because of financial
barriers." Little Sisters No. 2 raised the threshold for awarding interim costs even
further.15 According to the majority, interim costs may be awarded only where the
court would otherwise be participating in an injustice against the individual litigant
and the public more generally.6 In the majority's view, this restriction - which
effectively places a heavy burden on the applicant to show that an interim costs
award is the only way litigation of exceptional public importance can proceed"
was necessary in order to prevent interim costs from becoming a form of judicially
imposed legal aid.7' The restricted approach in Little Sisters No. 2 has drawn
criticism from some commentators who saw potential in Okanagan for courts to
respond to intractable problems of access to justice through interim costs awards.
For example, Faisal Bhabha argues that, "[i]n light of Little Sisters No. 2, we can
expect to see an even
greater reluctance on the part of litigants and courts to rely
79
on advance

costs.",

Mactavish J.'s decision to deny Abdeirazik interim costs offers a further
example of judicial reluctance in this area. Abdelrazik was legally unable to work
or receive funds. Canadian government action contributed to his risk of torture
abroad and his attempts to return to Canada were repeatedly thwarted by the
Canadian government using questionable methods and arguments. If someone in
Abdeirazik's extreme circumstances is ineligible for interim costs, given the
significance of his case for individual rights and the public more generally, then it
is difficult to imagine how litigants asserting govermnent violations of their
individual human rights could ever qualify.
It should be acknowledged that Mactavish J.'s decision to deny interim costs in
this case rested upon her factual finding that Abdelrazik had not fully explored all
possible avenues for pursuing the litigation. Moreover, she explicitly invited
Abdelrazik to bring a new motion for interim costs in the event that these avenues
were fully exhausted. And indeed, he was never in a position to do so because his
pro bono counsel persisted in representing him despite their earlier indication that
this may not be possible.
Because he was not, in the end, prevented from fully pursuing his litigation, it
would seem at first glance that Mactavish J. was correct in her view that declining
to award interim costs would not lead the court to participate in an injustice which, as we have seen, is the threshold established in Little Sisters No. 2 for when
interim costs are appropriate. However, in assessing Mactavish J.'s decision it is
essential to keep in mind the unusual circumstances Abdelrazik faced. Unlike most
74

Okanagan,supra note 57 at para 40.

75

Little Sisters No 2, supra note 58 at para 5.

76

Ibid at para 40.
Ibid.
Jbid at para 5.
Faisal Bhabha, "Institutionalizing Access-to-Justice: Judicial, Legislative and Grassroots
Dimensions" (2007) 33 Queen's LJ 139 at 151.

77
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litigants, he was physically unable to access the courts without legal representation
because he was (unconstitutionally) confined in the Canadian embassy in
Khartoum. At the same time, also because of his confinement, communication
with the outside world was difficult. In this context, expecting Abdelrazik to fully
pursue the option of funding the litigation through private charity seems
problematic. How was he supposed to seek an exemption from Canada's antiterrorist regulations, and then, if successful, organize private donations, when all
the while he was confined to the embassy in Khartoum? Surely such arrangements
would have had to be made by his pro bono lawyers on his behalf. In other words,
in finding that Abdeirazik must take further steps to fully exhaust the option of
financing his litigation through private charity, Mactavish J. seems to have
assumed that he would continue to receive pro bono representation, even if only to
arrange for the exemption and organize the donations.
Mactavish J.'s parallel holding that Abdelrazik failed to fully exhaust the
option of litigating the main application by relying on pro bono representation was
also problematic, even though the litigation did end up proceeding on this basis.
There are three main difficulties with this aspect of the decision. First, Mactavish
J. failed to discuss what Abdeirazik was supposed to do in the event that pro bono
counsel withdrew due to financial constraints. Though Mactavish J. left open the
possibility that in such circumstances Abdelrazik could bring a new motion for
interim costs, she neglected to indicate how he could do so without counsel while
he was effectively confined in an embassy abroad. Happily for Abdelrazik, such a
new motion was not necessary. Nonetheless, given uncontested evidence that
counsel re-evaluated on a monthly basis whether they could continue to provide
pro bono services, this was a possibility that should have been addressed.
Second, Mactavish J.'s decision places pro bono counsel in a difficult position.
Recall that Mactavish J. found that Abdeirazik was not entitled to interim costs in
part because it was not "clear" that his pro bono counsel would be forced to
withdraw, despite sworn affidavit evidence indicating that counsel did not believe
they could continue providing pro bono services due to financial constraints.
While Mactavish J. did not specify exactly what would constitute "clear" evidence
to this effect, it seems likely that a commitment to withdraw if interim costs are
denied would be necessary. As one of Abdelrazik's pro bono counsel, Amir
Attaran, describes it, this "is essentially to say that counsel has to blackmail the
court into awarding advance costs."" Moreover, it should be remembered that in
order to succeed in this "blackmail", pro bono counsel must simultaneously show
that the case is of such exceptional public importance that the court would be
involved in an injustice if the case were not litigated. In other words, to obtain
interim costs, pro bono counsel must (1) commit to withdrawing if interim costs
are denied, in cases where (2) the failure to litigate the case because legal
representation was unavailable would represent an injustice. That is to say, pro
bono counsel must commit to participate in the very injustice that they are asking
the court to prevent, and they may then be rewarded for that commitment by
having the court order an opposing party to pay their fees. It should also be noted
that, due to the complexity of motions for interim costs, it would be difficult for
most individuals challenging alleged human rights abuses abroad - even if they
s0
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are not confined in an embassy to bring forward such motions without the
assistance of pro bono counsel. In practice, then, it seems unlikely that motions for
interim costs will typically come before the courts except through the efforts of
pro bono counsel, who must then adopt this problematic position to succeed on the
motion.
Third, the reasoning behind Mactavish J.'s finding that there was insufficient
evidence that the litigation could not proceed on a pro bono basis may pose
significant challenges for many other individual human rights litigants seeking
interim costs. It is useful, in this respect, to compare typical individual human
rights cases with both aboriginal rights and group rights litigation, areas in which
interim costs requests have met with some degree of success."
There are significant differences between individual human rights litigation
and aboriginal rights litigation. For example, aboriginal rights litigation generally
involves disputes between two or more communities, yet the adjudicative
institutions in which the disputes are to be resolved have been designed by and are
largely controlled by one of the communities, which raises obvious procedural
fairness challenges. Aboriginal rights litigation also frequently engages the
honour of the Crown and always raises a long history of colonialism.! Given these
challenges, Canadian courts characterize aboriginal rights litigation as sui generis,
and often modify procedural rules in an attempt to accommodate the unique
circumstances of such litigation."

On a more day to day level, one further difference is that individual human
rights litigation is usually less costly and less drawn out than aboriginal rights
litigation. There are of course exceptions, but it is telling that Abdelrazik's main
application was fully litigated within a little over a year, whereas the issues at the
heart of the litigation that prompted the Okanagan decision in 2003 remain largely
unresolved at the time of writing. Similarly, counsel for Abdelrazik estimated the
value of their pro bono services at approximately $130,0005

whereas, in

Okanagan, the aboriginal community estimated the costs of a full trial at around
$814,000."
There are also important differences between individual human rights litigation
and group rights litigation. Consider for example, the recent decision, R v Caron,
81
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where the Supreme Court upheld an interim costs award in the context of
constitutional minority language rights litigation. In that case, Caron, a FrancoAlbertan, sought to challenge the constitutional validity of English-only traffic
ticket proceedings on the basis of a conflict with language rights purportedly
accorded through the Royal Proclamation of 1869. Caron initially funded the
litigation through private loans and donations, and through the now-defunct Court
Challenges Program. However, as the length of the trial increased and as the
voluminous historical evidence submitted by the Crown accumulated, he quickly
exhausted his funds and was unable to secure further funding. He therefore applied
for - and obtained - an interim costs award."
In upholding the interim costs award, the Supreme Court noted that the
litigant's resources were exhausted largely due to the substantial historical record
filed by the Crown and the large number of expert witnesses, and that as a result,
Caron could not proceed with the litigation without an interim costs award. '9
Moreover, the Court found that Caron had demonstrated at least a prima facie
case.9 Finally, the Court found that the case was of exceptional public importance
because it questioned the validity of all of Alberta's unilingual statutes: "The
injury created by continuing uncertainty about French language rights in Alberta
transcends Mr. Caron's particular situation and risks injury to the broader Alberta
public interest."'" As a result, the Supreme Court held that Caron met the test for
interim costs as established by Okanagan and Little Sisters No. 2. It would seem,
then, that part of the reason that interim costs were awarded in this case is that, as
with aboriginal rights litigation, minority language rights litigation often involves
voluminous historical records and entails disputes between communities that have
widespread effects beyond the individual litigants involved.
Interim costs decisions in aboriginal and group rights litigation are likely often
affected by factors such as voluminous records in cross-community disputes,
which may partly explain why interim costs awards appear more common in such
cases than in individual human rights litigation. Moreover, the fact that individual
human rights litigation is often less costly and drawn out than aboriginal and group
rights litigation likely means that arguments about the unavailability of pro bono
representation in individual human rights litigation will be more difficult to
substantiate. This seems particularly likely where the individual human rights
violation at stake attracts media attention and raises novel legal issues, thereby
making pro bono representation attractive to counsel. One would expect that these
factors will often be present in human rights cases that meet the other conditions
for interim costs awards (i.e. primafacie meritorious cases of exceptional public
importance). While aboriginal and group rights litigation may also be attractive to
pro bono counsel for similar reasons, the expense both in terms of hours and
disbursements
associated with litigating such cases make pro bono
representation in these circumstances more onerous.
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It therefore appears likely that Mactavish 's strict application of the first
branch of the Okanagan test to evaluate the viability of pro bono representation as
an alternative to interim costs will be applicable to many cases involving human
rights litigation, particularly outside the context of aboriginal and group rights. It
would seem, then, that for those who hoped that Okanagan offered a means of
funding prima facie meritorious human rights litigation of exceptional public
importance brought by impecunious individuals, Abdelrazik's experience indicates
that pro bono counsel arguing in favour of interim costs for their clients will face
an uphill battle
and they may be forced into uncomfortable positions in that
battle.
It must be emphasized that Abdelrazik was in an unusual situation. He was
reliant on counsel to challenge his unlawful exile and confinement in an embassy
abroad (i.e. he could not access the courts in person because of the very actions of
the Canadian government that he sought to challenge). He was subject to antiterrorist regulations that at least arguably prohibited others from paying for
counsel, and at any rate he did not have any means to organize private charity
except through the services of pro bono counsel. Although he obtained pro bono
counsel, they indicated that they may not be able to complete the litigation due to
financial considerations, and if they did withdraw he would have no way to act on
his own behalf, even for the limited purposes of seeking a new interim costs
award. If Abdelrazik was not eligible for interim costs in these circumstances, then
it is hard to imagine what individual human rights litigant would be especially
seeing as how motions for interim costs are unlikely to come before the courts
except through the assistance of pro bono counsel.
2. Interim Costs in Section 6 Litigation
In addition to exemplifying a restrictive approach to interim costs in individual
human rights litigation, and beyond its challenging implications for pro bono
counsel, Abdelrazik's experience has important repercussions for litigation
involving citizens who allege that their rights under section 6 of the Charter have
been violated. This provision, which essentially prohibits exile, is among the most
fundamental rights enjoyed by citizens." Indeed, the drafters of the Charter found
it prudent to allow the use of the section 33 notwithstanding clause to lawfully
abridge most individual rights, including the section 7 right not to be deprived of
life, liberty and security of the person except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice. The section 6 right to enter and remain in Canada, in contrast,
is among the limited set of rights that are so fundamental that they cannot lawfully
be abridged in this manner. Because of the fundamental importance of section 6
rights, credible allegations regarding violations of the right to be free from exile
should attract robust procedural protections. In assessing whether Abdelrazik
should have been entitled to interim costs, the necessity of robust procedural
protections where the right to be free from exile is at stake should have played a
central role.
It should be recalled that the government's central argument in Abdelrazik's
main application was that Canada could not provide him with the travel documents
92
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or otherwise assist in his repatriation so long as his name was included on the
Resolution 1267 list. However, the Resolution 1267 list is one of the most flawed
procedures established in the name of combating terrorism at the global level. The
plethora of procedural defects of the Resolution 1267 list includes: the failure to
accord the listed person the right to a hearing;" the failure to provide the listed
person with the evidence against them;' 4 the discretionary nature of listing and delisting, and an accompanying lack of clear norms for when listing and de-listing
are appropriate ; members of the committee who may have been responsible for
the initial listing request also hold a veto over any subsequent delisting;" and the
lack of a presumption of innocence.9 In light of these defects, Justice Zinn, who
presided over Abdelrazik's main application, describes the Resolution 1267 list
procedure in the following unflattering terms:
The 1267 Committee regime is...
a situation for a listed person
not unlike that of Josef K. in Kafka's The Trial, who awakens
one morning, and for reasons never revealed to him or the
reader, is arrested and prosecuted for an unspecified crime."
Not only was the particular mechanism the government used to justify refusing to
allow Abdelrazik's return to Canada procedurally problematic, but Abdelrazik's
case was also part of a troubling global trend whereby states seek to limit
procedural protections in national security investigations and enforcement."
Canada is a party to this trend. Consider, for instance, that wherever possible the
Canadian government prefers to deal with individuals who are suspected of posing
national security threats by deploying immigration procedures rather than criminal
law procedures.10 The reason for this preference is that immigration processes
involve less robust procedural protections than criminal law procedures. ' For
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example, non-citizens can be detained and deported if there are "reasonable
grounds to believe" that they have been, are, or may be in the future, members of
terrorist organizations."' To secure criminal convictions, however, more than mere
membership is needed and the standard of proof is much more demanding - not
reasonable grounds to believe, but beyond a reasonable doubt. '
Departures from standard human rights and due process norms by the
Canadian government in dealing with perceived national security threats are, of
course, not limited to the context of non-citizens. 4 However, outside the
immigration setting, the Charter imposes more significant restrictions. One way
the Canadian government has tried to circumvent these restrictions is by relocating
national security investigation and enforcement abroad in order to take advantage
of the historical reluctance of courts to give extra-territorial application to Charter
norms. This is particularly evident in several recent cases where Canadian
officials participated in the detention and interrogation abroad of Canadian citizens
suspected of having ties to terrorism. In many such cases, the citizens in question
allege that their detention and interrogation abroad involved mistreatment including torture - that would, if committed in Canada, violate Charternorms.1°
The most familiar example involves Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who was
tortured in Syria after he was subjected to extraordinary rendition while on a
stopover at an airport in the United States. A public inquiry into his case
determined that one of the reasons for his extraordinary rendition was information
provided by Canadian authorities to United States officials indicating, erroneously,
that he was associated with terrorists.0 7 The same public inquiry, after examining
other cases of Canadian citizens detained abroad, concluded that "there appears to
have been a pattern of investigative practices whereby Canadian agencies
interacted with foreign agencies in respect of Canadians held abroad in connection
with suspected terrorist activities.''1
One of the problematic features of Mactavish J.'s decision on Abdelrazik's
application for interim costs is that the decision was inattentive to this context. In
YB Access Just 25; Rayner Thwaites, "Discriminating Against Non-Citizens under the Charter:
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fact, Mactavish J. struck evidence of this context from the court record.
Specifically, she struck evidence of a larger pattern of human rights violations
against Canadian citizens abroad in the name of Canadian national security on the
grounds that it was "irrelevant".'" It is, however, hard to understand why a pattern
whereby Canadian authorities abroad violated other Canadian citizens' rights
would not be a relevant consideration in determining whether Abdelrazik's
allegations were likely to be primafacie meritorious, as well as in determining
whether exceptional circumstances existed that would justify an interim costs
award.
Had Mactavish J. been more attentive to this context, she may have been less
willing to apply a strict test for interim costs. ' Indeed, had the context played a
more prominent role in her reasoning, she may have explicitly considered whether
the test for interim costs needed to be modified in light of: (1) the importance of
the fundamental right of citizens to be free from exile and the need for robust
procedural protections when that right is at risk; (2) the serious procedural defects
in the 1267 Resolution list mechanism on which the government relied to justify
its refusal to allow Abdelrazik to return home; and, (3) the experience of several
other Canadian citizens abroad whose rights were violated by the Canadian
government in the name of national security. All these factors made it
exceptionally important that Abdelrazik be represented by competent counsel.
One way that Mactavish J. might have considered modifying the test for
interim costs in light of these circumstances would have been to draw upon
jurisprudence relating to section 7 of the Charter, which provides, "Everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.""' In New
Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G. (J.),11 the Supreme
Court held that courts may order state-funded legal representation to guarantee the
fairness of litigation implicating a person's right to life, liberty or security of the
person. To put this same point in slightly different terms, courts may order statefunded legal representation where such representation is necessary to ensure that a
person's section 7 rights are not breached in a manner that fails to comply with the
principles of fundamental justice. Expanding upon when courts should exercise
their discretion to order state-funded legal representation in such circumstances,
the Court indicated that the relevant factors include: "the seriousness of the
interests at' 3stake, the complexity of the proceedings and the capacity of the
[litigant]." 1
Even more significant than the test established by G. (J.)
which is less
onerous than the test for interim costs articulated in Okanagan and Little Sisters
No. 2 is that the Court was attentive to the context surrounding the case. The
109 Abdelrazik (re: Interim Costs), supra note 3 at para 9.
110 Paying further attention to context would be consistent with the approach recently taken by the
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underlying litigation involved a custody dispute, and the litigant had, in fact, been
represented on a pro bono basis at the custody hearing by the time the separate
issue of state-funded legal representation reached the Supreme Court. Because the
individual received pro bono representation at the custody hearing - and therefore
presumably enjoyed a fair procedure that complied with section 7 of the Charterthe matter of state-funded legal representation was technically moot.11 The Court
nonetheless agreed to decide the matter because the case raised the question of
whether parents have a constitutional right to state-funded legal representation in
importance." 115
custody hearings and this question was "undoubtedly of national
Moreover, the Court noted that the only way it was likely to ever be in a position
to decide this issue of national importance was by considering a moot case,
because complex constitutional issues of this kind generally require the assistance
of (pro bono) counsel in order to even come before the courts.
Significantly, this decision reveals that in cases implicating a person's right to
life, liberty and security of the person, courts may be willing to consider the
systemic issue of whether state-funded legal representation is constitutionally
required for a particular subset of litigants, even if the individual who requests the
state-funded legal representation actually obtained pro bono representation.
Courts will doubtless be cautious in making such findings, because these findings
appear to be a form of judicially imposed legal aid. But, in exceptional
circumstances, courts may be willing to establish constitutionally mandated statefunded legal representation for particular subsets of litigants who have serious
section 7 rights at stake in complex proceedings that they lack the capacity to
17
navigate alone.'

In Abdelrazik's case, Mactavish J. explicitly noted that counsel did not present
detailed arguments about this line of jurisprudence.'8 This omission arose largely
because such jurisprudence is grounded in the language of "fundamental justice"
from section 7 of the Charter, whereas Abdelrazik's counsel pursued the main
litigation on the basis of the violation of Abdeirazik's right to return to Canada as
protected by section 6 of the Charter. Though Abdeirazik's section 7 rights to life,
liberty and security of the person were surely engaged, the legal tests for when a
deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person abroad will be attributed to the
Canadian government for the purposes of section 7 are complex and constantly
evolving.'' It was a more straightforward matter to show that Abdelrazik's section
6 rights had been breached by the Canadian government, given that the Canadian
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government's refusal to issue him travel documents prevented him from returning
to Canada.2'
In this context, counsel's strategy of focusing on section 6 in the main
application seems to have been prudent, as was ultimately confirmed when
Abdeirazik succeeded on this basis in the main application. Moreover, this strategy
was also in keeping with the holding in Little Sisters No. 2, where the majority
held that cases must be framed as narrowly as possible so as to minimize their
expense where interim costs are sought. 2' While the jurisprudence on state-funded
legal representation in section 7 cases was not, as a result, put to Mactavish J. in
detail, it is worth considering whether the reasoning from G. (J.) might
nonetheless have been applicable to Abdelrazik's circumstances, even though the
main litigation involved section 6 rights. For example, counsel for Abdeirazik
might have reasonably contended that the violation of Abdeirazik's right to be free
from exile, protected by section 6, also implicitly engaged his section 7 rights,
including the right to both liberty and security of the person. As a result, while
Abdeirazik's main litigation proceeded on the basis of the alleged violation of
section 6, jurisprudence relating to state-funded legal representation in section 7
cases may still have been applicable. Alternatively, counsel for Abdelrazik could
have suggested that the reasoning behind G. (J.) should be extended beyond
section 7 cases to violations of other fundamental Charter rights, including the
right to be free from exile.
Regardless of the particular path chosen to justify applying the G. (J.) test, if
the test had been applied, Abdelrazik may have been eligible for state-funded legal
representation. Recall that the test considers: (1) the importance of the interests
affected by the litigation; (2) the complexity of the proceedings; and, (3) the
capacity of the individual involved. With respect to the first part of the test, it
seems evident that the alleged violation of Abdelrazik's fundamental right to be
free from exile was serious and engaged important interests. The second part of
the test would also have posed no problem, as the litigation involved complex
constitutional legal questions, hotly contested factual allegations involving
national security agencies, and the disturbing irregularities of the Resolution 1267
list procedures. Finally, with regard to the third part of the test, Abdelrazik's
capacity to self-represent was severely compromised by his confinement in an
embassy abroad.
Of course, given the oft-repeated concerns about courts refraining from
mandating judicially imposed legal aid schemes,12 it remains possible that courts
may impose the additional requirement that the applicant demonstrate that no other
alternatives are available, thereby importing the strict test from Little Sisters No. 2
to this context as well. Nonetheless, one key advantage to working with the G. (J.)
test, rather than through interim costs jurisprudence, is the way that G. (J.) was
attentive to systemic factors. What seems troubling about Mactavish J.'s refusal to
award Abdelrazik interim costs is not the effect this refusal had on Abdelrazik
120
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himself, after all his case was ultimately fully litigated on a pro bono basis. Rather,
what is troubling is the effect the decision may have on the ability of other
Canadian citizens to challenge the violation of their right to be free from exile,
especially where national security matters are at play. Had Mactavish J. ordered
state-funded legal representation in this case, these other Canadians would have
had an easier time securing counsel to challenge alleged human rights violations.
Like in G. (J.), this would have put the court in the difficult position of effectively
establishing judicially imposed legal aid, albeit in a highly constrained subset of
cases. However, in light of the larger context whereby the Canadian government
has evidently sought to escape court oversight and constitutional restraints in
national security investigation and enforcement activities by relocating those
activities abroad, providing those most deeply affected by these activities with the
right to state-funded legal representation would seem warranted.
In future litigation involving the section 6 rights of Canadians mistreated
abroad, the possibility of securing state-funded legal representation on this basis
should be explored further, particularly since Abdeirazik's experience appears to
indicate that obtaining state-funded legal representation in these cases through
interim costs awards is unlikely.
3. Pro Bono, Ex Post Costs & Contingency Fees
Although there may be avenues for securing access to justice for Canadians
mistreated abroad by attempting to work with the existing tests for interim costs
and both sections 6 and 7 of the Charter, considering the reluctance the courts
have shown in this area, other options should also be explored. Moreover, given
that publically funded legal representation for civil litigation more generally is
extremely limited, 23' and in some cases has been entirely eliminated,'24 options
other than publically funded legal representation need to be considered. Perhaps
the most likely alternative is what ended up being employed by Abdelrazik -pro
bono representation combined with costs awards at the conclusion of the litigation.
Recall that, despite personal hardship, Abdelrazik's counsel continued
representing him on apro bono basis. Moreover, Abdeirazik was successful on his
main application, in that the Justice Zinn found that his section 6 rights had been
'
1
breached and issued an order requiring the government to return him to Canada.
Shortly after issuing this decision, Justice Zinn ordered the government to pay
$47,500 in costs to Abdelrazik's pro bono counsel." ' This amount represented
more than standard party-party costs typically awarded in Federal Court, but less
than the $127,600 in solicitor-client costs sought by pro bono counsel. 1"In making
this costs award, Justice Zinn noted, "Counsel in this instance, taking on Mr.

123

124

125
126
127

Civil litigation is seldom funded in most legal aid programs in Canada. See generally, Michael
Trebilcock, Report of the LegalAidReview, (Toronto: Attorney General of Ontario, 2008), see
especially at 76.
Consider, for example, the Court Challenges Program. Carissima Mathen, "Access to Charter
Justice and the Rule of Law" (2009) 25 NJCL 191 at 197.
Abdelrazik (Ma in Application), supra note 5 at para 170.
Abdelrazik (re: Ex PostCosts), supra note 51.
bid atpara 4.

Vol 29(1)

Abdeirazik v Canada (Re: Interim Costs)

Abdelrazik's case in circumstances where he was unable to do so personally and
was impecunious, conducted themselves in the best tradition of the Bar." '
Thus, although the court was unwilling to award interim costs in advance of
the determination on the merits, the court nonetheless awarded costs to
Abdeirazik's pro bono counsel when the litigation proved successful. This is in
keeping with recent case law establishing that pro bono counsel may be entitled to
compensation through ex post costs awards. 1"To be sure, such costs awards do not
usually fully compensate pro bono counsel for their time because full solicitorclient costs awards are rare. Moreover, these awards operate in a similar manner
as contingency fee arrangements - awards will typically only be available where
pro bono counsel succeeded on the merits. Nonetheless, such awards may make it
easier for some impecunious litigants - including perhaps some Canadian citizens
mistreated abroad - to obtain counsel because the possibility of a costs award may
mitigate some of the hardship for pro bono counsel in terms of lost fees and out of
pocket disbursements.
In addition to the possibility of obtaining costs awards at the completion of
litigation, contingency fee arrangements may be used to fund litigation in cases
where compensation may eventually be sought for the mistreatment Canadian
citizens suffer abroad at the hands of Canadian officials. Now that Abdeirazik is
back in Canada, he has sued the government for over $24 million and the Minister
of Foreign affairs in his personal capacity for $2 million.131 The pro bono counsel
who assisted Abdelrazik with his application to return to Canada also represent
him in the lawsuit for compensation. Because the requested compensation is
substantial, this type of case is amenable to contingency fee arrangements. It is,
therefore, possible to imagine in these sorts of cases contingency fee arrangements
entered into at the outset, where counsel agrees to represent Canadians mistreated
abroad in their constitutional litigation on a pro bono basis with the stipulation that
they will be entitled to any applicable costs award in that litigation, and that any
subsequent suits involving damages will be handled on a contingency fee basis.
Such a scenario could provide counsel with a financial incentive (or less of a
financial disincentive) to take at least certain types of well-founded cases.
Of course, there are several limitations to funding individual human rights
litigation through pro bono representation with the possibility of ex post costs
awards and contingency fees in subsequent litigation regarding compensation.
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For example, individuals who are unpopular or unsympathetic may find it difficult
to secure representation. Similarly, cases that appear likely to be drawn out and
expensive may be less likely to attract pro bono counsel on these terms. Moreover,
cases where compensation for individual human rights violations is unlikely may
also prove less attractive to counsel. Still, considering the narrow approach to
interim costs adopted by courts as reflected in Abdeirazik's experience, as well as
other restrictions on publically funded legal services, lawyers acting in the "best
tradition of the bar" by providing pro bono services may be the only viable route
through which Canadians mistreated abroad in the name of national security can
proceed with litigation. Perhaps for some of these pro bono counsel, the possibility
of being compensated for at least part of their time through ex post costs awards,
as well as the possibility of contingency fees in subsequent litigation may help to
make their provision of pro bono services financially viable. In other words, if
access to justice for individuals mistreated overseas depends on the ability of
litigants to find lawyers willing to bear the financial burden of the litigation,
measures such as ex post costs and contingency fees may make it easier to obtain
access to justice. I hasten to add, however, that this is a highly restrictive approach
to providing access to justice for Canadians mistreated abroad, one that is not
especially sensitive to the serious nature of the violations at stake or the merits of
the underlying claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Abdelrazik's experience raises challenging questions about access to justice in
human rights litigation involving Canadian citizens mistreated abroad. Indeed, his
experience shows the importance of competent legal representation when one's
government breaches one's fundamental human rights abroad in the name of
national security. Abdelrazik remains, at the time of writing, subject to serious
national security restrictions and he has not yet received any compensation for the
breach of his constitutional rights. Although, through the efforts of his pro bono
counsel, he ultimately won his Charter litigation, resulting in his repatriation, his
experience nonetheless holds troubling implications for the availability of interim
costs awards in future individual human rights litigation and for pro bono counsel
applying for such awards. In addition, his experience demonstrates the need for
new approaches to requests for state-funded legal representation for Canadian
citizens who are denied the right to return to Canada in contexts where national
security issues are at play. It also highlights the continued importance of pro bono
services, as well as the significance of ex post costs awards where individual
human rights litigants are represented on a pro bono basis.
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